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Corporate Securities As "Business Property"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code divides taxable gains and deductible
losses into two broad classes-ordinary and capital-and prescribes
different tax treatment for each.' Generally speaking, capital gains
are taxed at lower, non-progressive rates.2 Capital losses are deducti-
ble from only a limited segment of income,3 but, in the case of
noncorporate taxpayers, may be carried forward indefinitely.4 On the
other hand, deductible ordinary losses may be deducted from any
taxable income,5 but may be deducted in other years only under
certain circumstances.
6
The Code effects the division between capital and ordinary gain
or loss by prescribing "capital" treatment for those gains or losses
arising on the "sale or exchange" of "capital assets."7 Thus, the"capital asset" concept is the Code's principal control point in screen-
ing out those transactions which should not be accorded preferential
tax treatment. "Capital asset" is initially defined as "property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business).",,
Obviously, this broad definition, standing alone, would destroy the
distinction it was designed to create; in one sense everything the
taxpayer holds is "property." It would thus seem that all income
could well be "capital gain," since any moneys received by the tax-
payer could be regarded as being derived from the "sale or exchange"
of a property interest.9 Therefore, to give meaning to the definition,
five types of property are excluded from the general definition.10
The express wording of the statute provides that if the "property"
involved is not covered by one of the enumerated exclusions, it re-
mains in the residual category of "capital asset" and the income or
loss arising on its disposition will be capital gain or loss. Because of
the dramatic difference in the applicable ordinary and capital gains
1. See INT. RPv. CODE of 1954, §§ 161, 165, 1201, 1202, 1211.
2. Id. § 1201. The effect of this section is to subject capital gains to a maximum
rate of 25%.
3. Id. § 1211.
4. Id. § 1212. Corporate taxpayers are limited to a five-year carryover for capital
losses, except in the case of a "foreign expropriation capital loss," for which a ten-year
carryover is allowed. Id. § 1212(a).
5. Id. §§ 63(a), 165.
6. Id. § 172.
7. Id. §§ 1201, 1202, 1222.
8. Id. § 1221.
9. See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HAry. L. REv.
985, 988 (1956). For example, a claim to salary is certainly "property" in one sense
of the term. Therefore, a sale of the claim would produce a capital gain.
10. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221(1)-(5). It should also be noted that the
Code contains provisions relaxing the basic requirements, making more difficult the
achievement of capital gain treatment, or denying it altogether. For example, capital
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rates, most taxpayers have a "terrific stimulus"" to seek to classify
their income as capital gain.-2 The Code's method of definition works
to the advantage of these taxpayers, who often seek to avoid the
exclusions by fashioning income-producing activities into dispositions
of non-excluded "property."'3 Thus, the "capital asset" definition
jeopardizes the very distinction it attempts to create.
If the courts had taken the position that the exclusionary categories
provided the only exceptions to the broad warrant for capital treat-
ment of property sales and exchanges, the class of transactions
receiving capital treatment might have absorbed a large portion of
all income-producing activities. This approach would have been
supported by both the Regulations 14 and legislative history.15 How-
ever, to prevent such an erosion of the ordinary income tax base,
and to implement what was felt to be the broad congressional intent
behind the capital gain-ordinary income distinction, the courts have
felt a need to go further than the statutory exclusions in narrowing
the range of capital gain treatment. 6 This narrowing has been accom-
plished in two ways: (1) interpreting the statutory exclusions
broadly;17 and (2) giving the definitional term "property" a restrictive
meaning.18 This latter approach has been increasingly recognized as
a more fruitful source of limitations on capital gain treatment than the
former. By holding that an asset is not "property" for the purposes of
gain treatment is often required for certain types of dispositions even though there
might not otherwise be a "sale or exchange," or the property might not be a "capital
asset." See, e.g., §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2), 421(d)(4), 1231, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1240.
In several sections capital gain treatment is denied even though there may be a "sale
or exchange" of a "capital asset." See, e.g., §§ 304, 306, 341, 342, 356(a) (2), 421(b).
See also Hacker, Bringing Capital Gains into Focus, 12 W. REs. L. REv. 252 (1961).
11. Surrey, supra note 9, at 988.
12. "A craving for capital gain has come to be a signpost of our tax system, with
immeasurable effort being exerted toward creating capital gain in place of ordinary
income. The constant stream of human ingenuity aimed at exploring this avenue of
tax reduction has left its impact on most profit making activities . . ..! Handfield,
Recent Developments in Capital Gain v. Ordinary Income, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED.
TAx. 11 (1961). See Surrey, supra note 9, at 988.
13. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 988; Comment, The Troubled Distinction Between
Capital Gain and Ordinary Income, 73 YALE L.J. 693, 694 (1964).
14. "The term 'capital assets' includes all classes of property not specifically ex-
cluded by section 1221." Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(a) (1957).
15. Section 117 (1939), now section 1221, was intended to define a capital asset
as "all property, except as specifically excluded." H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 31 (1934).
16. See Comment, supra note 13, at 694-95.
17. See 3B J. MERa is, LAw OF FEDERAL INcoism TAxT noN § 22.11 (Malone ed.
1966).
18. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Hort v. Com-
missioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). See 3B J. MERTENs, supra note 17, at §§ 22.11, 22.12;
Katcher, A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation Problems and Proposals, U. So. CAL.




section 1221, a court can deny capital treatment to a transaction even
though the asset does not come within the literal language of the
statutory exclusions.19 Generally speaking, this approach should not
be considered unwarranted judicial legislation, since Congress failed
to indicate in any respect what was meant by the term "property."
Because this term can be used so loosely and in so many different
ways, Congress necessarily thrust upon the courts the task of infusing
a meaning into the word which would be consistent with the basic
ordinary income-capital gains distinction.2 As Surrey has said, these
developments "represent the courts' view that Congress ...did not
desire to be taken literally when it used the broad term 'property'
in section 1221. The courts are willing to rescue Congress from its
statutory strait jacket."21
Thus, in several areas the courts have been groping beyond the
letter of section 1221 in an effort to apply the spirit of the ordinary
income-capital gain distinction. By refusing to view "property" as
the broad and flexible concept it has become in the general body of
law,22 the courts have developed a "common law" of capital gains
taxation23 which denies capital treatment to certain transactions, even
though they seem to fit within the literal terms of the definition. For
instance, in Hort v. Commissioner,12 the Supreme Court was asked
to determine the tax status of 140,000 dollars paid by a lessee to
his lessor for cancellation of a lease with a fourteen-year term remain-
ing. The taxpayer contended that the lump-sum payment should be
taxed as capital gain. The Court held that the disputed amount was
"essentially a substitute for rental payments which section [61(a)
(5)] expressly characterizes as gross income .... ."25 Because the
payment was deemed to be a substitute for ordinary income, capital
gain treatment was denied. Similarly, in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake,
Inc., 6 the taxpayer assigned an oil payment right in consideration for
the cancellation of a debt. The taxpayer reported the oil payment
19. See Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51 (1955). "While
a capital asset is defined in [§ 1221] as property held by the taxpayer, it is evident
that not everything which can be called property in the ordinary sense and which is
outside the statutory exclusions qualifies as a capital asset." Commissioner v. Gellett
Motor Trans., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
20. See Zarky, Capital Gain Concepts: What Is a Capital Asset? When Is There
a "Sale or Exchange?" U. So. CAL. 1959 TAx INST. 357, 363.
21. Surrey, supra note 9, at 995-96.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Pittsburgh Athletic
Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
23. See B. BrrrKcz, FEnznAx INcoim, EsTATE AND Gn.-T TAXAATno 490 (1946);
Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 249 (1961)
(criticizes unnecessary "judicial interpolation into a meticulously drafted statute," i.e.,
section 1221).
24. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
25. Id. at 31.
26. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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assignment as a sale of property producing a profit of 600,000 dollars,
taxable as long-term capital gain. The Supreme Court acknowledged
that under the applicable state property law oil payments are interests
in land. However, the Court ruled that the gain on the sale of the
payment right was ordinary income because the "lump sum considera-
tion seems essentially a substitute for what would otherwise be
received at a future time as ordinary income."27 In holding that this
payment was a substitute for ordinary income, the Court appeared
to be motivated by two related factors: (1) the near identity between
the sales price and the discounted value of the pay-out expected from
the transferred right,2 8 and (2) the short life of the transferred in-
terest.29 The Hort and Lake decisions are representative of many
others in which courts have more or less candidly held the proceeds
from sales of certain types of property to be "substitutes for ordinary
income."30
II. "BusNEss PRoPERTY"--"INvESTMENT PROPERTY" DISTINCTION
Another judicial device designed to effect a proper differentiation
between capital gain and ordinary income should be compared with
the "substitution" doctrine set forth above. This device involves the
drawing of a distinction between "investment property" and "business
property." The policy behind this distinction is derived from section
1221(1), which excludes from capital gain treatment:
stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close
of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business....
Although the scope of this exclusion is somewhat uncertain, its main
objective is reasonably clear. By it, Congress is attempting to exclude
from capital treatment all of those gains which it regards as everyday
profits of the business world.31 The courts effect this basic policy in
two ways. Under the first approach, the statutory exclusion is gener-
27. Id. at 265.
28. Id. at 265-66.
29. Id. at 262-63.
30. See generally B. BrrrnEn, supra note 23, at 499-535; 3B f. Manm-s, supra note
17, at § 22.12; Handfield, supra note 12, at 11-16; Rockier, Frolics and Detours in
Capital Gains, 14 TAxEs 858 (1963); Surrey, supra note 9, at 1003-08. It has been
pointed out that the analytical underpinning of the substitute for ordinary income
doctrine is faulty because the market price of investment property (admittedly subject
to capital treatment) "is composed of the discounted value of the future income antici-
pated to flow from the investment while its owner holds it plus the discounted value
of the proceeds expected upon the resale of the property at the end of that period ....
All gain on property transactions could thus be characterized as a substitute for ordinary
income.' Comment, supra note 13, at 705.
31. See Surrey, supra note 9, at 989-90.
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ally applied broadly in those cases dealing with transactions which
arguably come within its language.S2 However, it should be noted that
a recent Supreme Court decision 3 has narrowed the range of this
exclusion by holding that the phrase "primarily for sale to customers"
means "principally," rather than "substantially" for sale to customers.
The second approach is not concerned with the statutory exclusion.
Rather, the "business"-"investment" distinction is achieved by viewing
the definitional term "property" as an elastic concept, a rough dis-
tinction being drawn between "business property" and "investment
property." Only if the transaction concerns a disposition of "invest-
ment property" will capital treatment be accorded. In effect, a judicial
concept of "property" has been superimposed upon section 1221,
excluding from that section all non-investment property held in the
taxpayer's business. By narrowing the range of "property," the "capital
asset" concept is narrowed, and thus the number of transactions
receiving capital treatment is reduced.34
III. CORPORATE SECURITIES AS "BusnTEss PROPERTY"
A. Prior to 1955
The remainder of this note deals with one aspect of the general
business-investment distinction outlined above-the judicial erosion of
the concept of securities as capital assets. By utilizing the "business
property" and "investment property" concepts, the courts have con-
tracted the definition of the term "capital asset" to exclude, in some
circumstances, securities acquired for reasons connected with the tax-
payer's trade or business. This is a development of relatively recent
origin. Prior to 1955, the "capital asset" concept was not seen as a fruit-
ful source of limitation on capital gain treatment. Courts adhered fairly
strictly to the view that the only types of assets which are non-capital
are those which come within the enumerated exclusions.35 Often those
exclusions were applied rather loosely so as to withdraw the asset
32. See 3B J. MERTNs, supra note 17, at § 22.15.
33. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
34. See generally Katcher, supra note 18, at 775-76; Surrey, supra note 9, at 989-96;
Comment, supra note 13, at 710-16.
35. See Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1947);
Logan & Kanawha Coal Co., 5 T.C. 1298 (1945); McGhee Upholstery Co., 12 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1455 (1953). In three cases, courts allowed the cost of stock to be
deducted as a business expense. These cases all involved the purchase of stock without
hope of any recovery by the taxpayer. Helvering v. Community Bond & Mortgage
Corp., 74 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1935) (purchase of stock of sales agency injuring tax-
payer's good will); Commissioner v. The Hub, 68 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1934) (purchase
of stock in non-profit corporation designed to lure industry into area); Pressed Steel
Car Co., 20 T.C. 198 (1953) (purchase of stock of corporation whose sole asset was
disputed contract with taxpayer). See Troxell and Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Con-
cept of Securities as Capital Assets, 19 TAX L. REv. 185, 188-93 (1964).
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from capital gain treatment. 36 However, in 1955 three different courts,
in three important cases, departed from the literal wording of section
1221 and firmly established the "business property"-"investment
property" distinction. Two of these cases involved securities; 37 the
third, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,38 did not deal
with securities, but its reasoning is generally regarded as controlling
cases dealing with securities acquired in connection with business
activities.
B. Bagley & Sewall Co., Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co.,
Corn Products Refining Co.
Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co.,39 decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, involved the purchase of United States
Government bonds by a machinery manufacturer and their deposit,
pursuant to a contract, with the purchaser's customer as security for
the performance of the contract. Two weeks after the bonds were
released from escrow they were sold at a loss. The Commissioner
urged that the "all inclusive language of section [1221] requires that,
since the bonds are 'property,' they must be treated as capital assets
unless exempted by the specific language of the section."40 The court
refused to accept this argument, and held the loss to be deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. The court found that
the taxpayer did not intend to hold the bonds as an investment, but
acquired them solely to carry out the terms of the principal contract.
Therefore, the bond transaction was not to be considered independ-
ently of the principal contract. The purchase and sale of the bonds
"was merely an incident in the carrying on by the petitioner of its
regular business."4' The purchase of the bonds could not be distin-
guished from the "ordinary premium expense of a surety company
bond which is a usual item of contractor's costs."42 Thus, the court
36. In Western Wine & Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952), the taxpayer bought
American Distilling Co. stock, which carried with it the right to buy a certain quantity
of whiskey from the issuer at cost. Soon after exercising its rights, taxpayer sold the
stock at a loss. Finding that the taxpayer had purchased the stock solely to replenish
its whiskey inventories, the court held the loss to be a part of the cost of the whiskey.
The shares were fitted into the "held primarily for sale to customers" exclusion. For
similar results, see Hogg v. Allen, 105 F. Supp. 12 (M.D. Ga. 1952), aff'd sub nom.
Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1954); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d
361 (1st Cir. 1932); Flom v. Hofferbert, 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9236 (D. Md. 1955);
Charles A. Clark, 19 T.C. 48 (1952); Joe B. Fortson, 47 B.T.A. 158 (1942).
37. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955); Tulane
Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
38. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
39. 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
40. Id. at 946.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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felt that since the circumstances and factual background showed that
the purchase and sale of the securities were merely an incident of the
taxpayer's business, the capital gain and loss sections should not be
considered:
In brief, it is urged that the all inclusive language of Section 117 [capital
gain provisions], require that, since the bonds are 'property,' they must be
treated as capital assets unless exempted by the specific language of the
Section. The argument carries with it the necessary conclusion that the
circumstances of the transaction, its factual background, the necessities of
the business involved and intentions of taxpayer are of no importance
except in determining whether the bonds are exempted under the Section.
We are not persuaded that Section 23 [deductions from gross income] is so
completely subordinate to Section 117. . . . [B]usiness expense, Section 23,
has been many times determined by business necessity without a specific
consideration of Section 117.
43
It is interesting to note that the Tax Court had found that the
bonds "were held for sale to purchasers as soon as released
from escrow and available for sale."44 Thus, the Tax Court reached
the result that the loss could be deducted from ordinary income on
the theory that "the sale of bonds was of assets held for sale in the
ordinary course of . . . business."45 This placed the bonds into one
of the enumerated exclusions in the definition of capital assets.
Although not explicitly disagreeing with that line of reasoning, the
court of appeals implicitly disapproved the Tax Court's rationale by
reaching its decision without a consideration of the capital gain and
loss provisions. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co. was probably
the first case to find directly that, with regard to securities, the
"capital asset" definition of the Code is not an adequate expression
of the concept.46 In effect, it held that the bonds held by the tax-
payer constituted "business property" and, hence, were excluded from
capital treatment.47
In Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co.,48 taxpayer was a lumber and
plywood wholesaler. Solely for the purpose of obtaining a needed
supply of plywood, taxpayer purchased debentures issued by a ply-
43. Id. at 946-47.
44. Id. at 946.
45. Bagley & Sewall Co., 20 T.C. 983, 989 (1953).
46. See discussion accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra; Surrey, supra note 9, at 995;
Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 188-94.
47. Judge Frank dissented on the ground that the majority improperly "invented"
another exception to § 117(a)(1) (now § 1221). He felt that the court's approach
disregarded "one of the most sensible canons of statutory construction, i.e., that, where
a statute sets forth specific exceptions, further exceptions, by way of mere implication,
are not permissible." Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944, 950 (2d
Cir. 1955). For other criticisms of Bagley & Sewall, see Freeman, Is There a New
Concept of Business Asset?, 36 TAxEs 110, 111-13 (1958).
48. 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
wood supplier who agreed to allocate a portion of its production to
debenture holders. After several years in which the taxpayer received
substantial amounts of plywood from the supplier, it became apparent
that taxpayer could obtain no further production through its deben-
ture holding, nor could it expect to realize any return on the cost
of its debentures. The Tax Court, in holding that the worthless
debentures could be fully deducted as a business expense or business
loss, said:
Petitioner's action in purchasing the debenture was a reasonable and neces-
sary act in the conduct of its business. The loss of the purchase price was
proximately related to that acquisition. Hence under section 23 [deductions
from gross income] the amount was a deductible business expense, or busi-
ness loss, properly taken in the instant year since that was the first time the
reason for holding the debenture disappeared and the extent of the loss
could be accurately measured. 9
The court expressly relied on Bagley & Sewall by holding that the loss
was a business expense or business loss under section 23 of the 1939
Code, without specifically considering section 117. In so holding, the
court disapproved and disregarded two prior cases which had estab-
lished a contrary precedent. A 1945 Tax Court case, Logan &
Kanawha Coal Co.,50 was "no longer.., regarded as authoritative."51
In that case, taxpayer contended that he had acquired corporate stock
for the primary purpose of maintaining favorable commercial relations
and securing a needed supply of coal. When the disposition of the
shares brought a loss, business expense or loss treatment was claimed
by taxpayer. The coirot ruled that the stock was a capital asset be-
cause it did not fall within one of the enumerated exclusions of
section 117. The court would consider section 23 only if the securities
were not "capital assets" according to the strict terms of section 117.
Tulane Hardwood, following the Bagley & Sewall rationale, ap-
proached the problem in exactly the opposite manner-section 117
would be considered only if the disposition of the securities were
not first found to be a business expense or loss.52
The Tulane Hardwood court rejected the reasoning of another
important case, Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner.P In this
Second Circuit case, taxpayer purchased World's Fair debentures as
a condition precedent to obtaining concessions at the 1939 World's
Fair. The debentures were sold at a loss shortly after the Fair closed.
49. Id. at 1150.
50. 5 T.C. 1298 (1945).
51. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146, 1150 (1955).
52. The court quoted from Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co.: "business ex-
pense, Section 23, has been many times determined by business necessity without a
specific consideration of Section 117." Id. at 1150-51.
53. 163 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1947).
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The court held that the debentures were an investment, did not fit
within any of the exclusionary clauses, and therefore were capital
assets. Bagley & Sewall did not expressly overrule Exposition
Souvenir, but attempted to distinguish it on the ground that in
Exposition Souvenir the purchase of the bonds was not an integral part
of the concession contract. Also, in that case the Tax Court had made
an express finding of fact that the stock was held as an investment.5
However, it is clear that the reasoning of Exposition Souvenir was
undermined by Bagley & Sewall. The Exposition Souvenir rationale
was similar to that of Logan & Kanawha Coal Co.-the court would
consider section 23 (business expense or loss) only if the securities
were not "capital assets" according to the strict terms of section 117.
As pointed out above, Bagley & Sewall determined the question of
whether a business expense or loss had occurred, without a prior
consideration of section 117. Furthermore, the facts of Exposition
Souvenir do not appear to be sufficiently dissimilar to those of Bagley
& Sewall to warrant the difference in result.55 This was recognized by
the Tulane Hardwood court: "[T]he facts scarcely warrant a finding
of 'investment' purpose in the acquisition by a concessionaire of
essential World's Fair debentures [Exposition Souvenir] and not in
the purchase of Government bonds to be used as security for perform-
ance of a contract [Bagley & Sewal]."56 The court, implying that
Bagley & Sewall had overruled Exposition Souvenir, expressly fol-
lowed the Bagley & Sewall rationale. By refusing to follow those
cases holding that a security must be classified as a capital asset, the
Tulane Hardwood court thereby contributed to the development of
the "business property"-"investment property" distinction. 7
The third important case of 1955 was Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Commissioner.8 In this landmark case, the Supreme Court clarified
the "business property" doctrine which had been introduced by
Bagley & Sewall and Tulane Hardwood, and extended that doctrine
by excluding from the definition of "capital asset" all property held
without investment intent in connection with taxpayer's business.
Here, taxpayer manufactured products made from grain corn. During
54. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944, 946 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. See 3B J. MumNs, supra note 17, at § 22.16.
56. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146, 1149 (1955). But see Wflaka
Builders, Inc. v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Exposition
Souvenir followed, and Bagley & Sewall distinguished because in instant case taxpayer
was not required to submit bonds as security). In Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United
States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958), the court felt that the effect of Exposition
Souvenir was substantially weakened in view of the fact that it was decided under
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), which obligated the court to follow
the Tax Court's "findings of evidentiary facts." The Dobson rule was rescinded by
statute in 1948 (presently section 7482).
57. See Herzberg, Capital Loss or Business Deduction, 43 TAXES 176 (1965).
58. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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the mid-thirties, droughts in the corn-raising areas of the country
caused the price of spot corn to rise to a point at which taxpayer
discovered that its goods could not compete profitably with non-corn
substitutes. As a result it adopted a program of buying corn futures
in order to avoid future drought-caused increases in raw material
costs. This program was the most economical method of obtaining
an adequate supply of corn without entailing the expenditure of large
sums for additional storage facilities. Taxpayer would take delivery
on the futures contracts as it found necessary, and would sell the
excess futures if no shortage were imminent. In this manner it
reached a balanced position with reference to any increase in corn
prices. The gains and losses from the sale of futures were originally
reported as ordinary income and loss, but taxpayer later contended
that they should have been taxed as capital gains and losses. Taxpayer
did not dispute that the futures transactions were an integral part
of its trade or business; rather, it insisted that the futures contracts
were "property" entitled to capital treatment under section 117 of
the 1939 Code, whether or not they were acquired for business
purposes.
The Supreme Court held that the futures contracts were not capital
assets despite the fact, as the Court acknowledged, that "petitioner's
corn futures do not come within the literal language of the exclusions
set out in [section 117]." 59 The Court felt that the preferential tax
treatment provided by the capital gain and loss sections should be
applied only when consistent with the congressional purpose. This
purpose was seen to be the separation, for tax purposes, of invest-
ment activities from everyday business activities:
Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday operation
of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital
gain or loss. The preferential treatment provided by § 117 applies to trans-
actions in property which are not the normal source of business income. It
was intended "to relieve the taxpayer from . . . excessive tax burdens on
gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove
the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions."60 (Emphasis
added).
The Court was convinced that taxpayer was not a capital investor
or 'legitimate capitalist" 61 seeking to make a profit by trading in
corn futures, but a self-insurer seeking to protect its profit margin
on the sale of corn products:
59. Id. at 51.
60. Id. at 52.
61. "Legitimate capitalists" are investors who purchase and sell such things as
commodity futures for "future delivery with a view to profit based on the laws of
supply and demand." 3B J. MERTENs, supra note 17, at § 22.14.
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[I]n labeling its activity as that of a "legitimate capitalist" exercising "good
judgment" in the futures market, petitioner ignores the testimony of his own
officers that in entering that market the company was "trying to protect a
part of [its] manufacturing costs;" that its entry was not for the purpose of
"speculating and buying and selling corn futures" but to fill an actual "need
for the quantity of corn [bought] . . .in order to cover . . . what [products]
we expected to market .... " [Tihis is not the talk of the capital investor
but of the farsighted manufacturer. For tax purposes petitioner's purchases
have been found to "constitute an integral part of its manufacturing busi-
ness .... 62 (Emphasis added).
Because the futures transactions were an integral part of taxpayer's
everyday business operations, the futures contracts themselves were
held to be non-capital assets.
The Corn Products case was a very significant development in
capital gains taxation. Bagley & Sewall and Tulane Hardwood had
introduced a rudimentary "business property"-"investment property"
distinction. In effect, they had held that by definition section 117
(now section 1221), which deals with investment activities, does
not reach the items that are covered by section 23 (now sections
162(a) and 165(a)). Section 23 items are those expenditures and
losses arising from the everyday operation of the taxpayer's business.
In order to hold that section 117 did not reach such expenditures, the
Bagley & Sewall and Tulane Hardwood courts necessarily held by
implication that the term "property" as used in section 117 meant
less than all items capable of being sold. Corn Products is significant
because it clarified these earlier cases by specifically holding that
"property" does not include property acquired in connection with
the everyday business activities of the taxpayer.63 This decision in
effect rewrites section 1221 by excluding from the definitional concept
"capital asset" all property6 held, without investment intent, in
connection with the taxpayer's everyday business operations. With
this "everyday operations" test as the determinant of the proper taxa-
tion treatment, the use made of the property, rather than its external
characteristics, becomes the critical factor.6 This approach was
62. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51 (1955).
63. See the analysis of Troxell and Noall, supra note 35, at 195.
64. It is clear that Corn Products is not limited to hedging transactions. The Supreme
Court chose to affirm the Second Circuit's decision on this broad "business property"
rationale. The Second Circuit had held that the futures contracts came within the
inventory exclusionary clause. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513,
516 (2d Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court opinion has been criticized for failing to fit
the futures into the section 1221(1) exclusion. See Brown, supra note 23, at 249
(Corn Products is an "entirely unnecessary opinion"); Freeman, Is There a New Con-
cept of Business Asset?, 36 TAXEs 110 (1958); Kaufmann, A Second Look at the Corn
Products Doctrine, 41 TAXEs 605, 607 (1963).
65. See Silverstein, The Capital Asset Definition, 2 TAx RIvisON Comrzamrum
1285, 1287-88 (House Committee on Ways and Means 1959) (comparison made
between "historical" or traditional characterization and "characterization based on use").
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borrowed from the definitional section itself. Section 1221(1) ex-
cludes assets from capital treatment if they are used in a specified
way by the taxpayer-i.e., "property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
The Court used these excluded categories as indicia, pointing toward
the type of property Congress intended to exclude.66 From this, the
Court inferred the basic congressional policy: the exclusion from
capital treatment of everyday business transactions. As explained
before, this policy was effectuated by rewriting the term "property"
to read "investment property." Thus, the Corn Products decision
actually did little more than give this definitional term a meaning
consistent with congressional policy.6 7
C. Post-Corn Products Cases
Since the Supreme Court's decision twelve years ago in Corn
Products, the courts have had a number of opportunities to consider
the implications of the "business property"-"investment property"
distinction, as applied to transactions in securities. All of these subse-
quent cases have involved losses on the disposition of securities. The
general rule applied in these cases is well stated in a 1962 Court of
Claims case, Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States:
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act
in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the time
of their sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully deducted
from gross income as a business expense or ordinary loss. If, on the other
hand, an investment purpose be found to have motivated the purchase or
holding of the securities, any loss realized upon their ultimate disposition
must be treated in accord with the capital asset provisions of the Code.68
1. Source-of-Materials Cases.-Ten of these post-Corn Products
cases have been "source-of-materials" cases. These deal with a single
pattern of facts: the taxpayer acquired the securities in order to
obtain a supply of goods in short supply and needed by the tax-
payer in his business.69 Typical of these cases is Electrical Fittings
66. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
67. There are several excellent discussions of the Corn Products case. See Herzberg,
supra note 57, at 179; Surrey, supra note 9, at 989-96; Troxell & Noall, supra note 35,
at 187-88; Note, Judicial Treatment of "Capital" Assets Acquired for Business: The
New Criterion, 65 YALE L.J. 401 (1956); Comment, supra note 13, at 710-12.
68. 303 F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. CI. 1962).
69. Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (shortage of
newsprint); Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958)
(to obtain a line of women's clothing); Planter's Exchange, Inc. v. United States, 57-1
U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9565 (N.D. Fla. 1957) (shortage of nitrogen used in fertilizer);
Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (shortage of
newsprint); Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962) (shortage of sulphite pulp); Electrical
Fittings Corp, 33 T.C. 1026 (1960) (shortage of iron castings); Gulftex Drug Co.,
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Corp.,7 0 in which the taxpayer manufactured and sold electrical con-
duit fittings. Because of the Korean conflict, the taxpayer was faced
with a shortage of iron castings, the raw material which it fashioned
into fittings. To overcome this shortage, the taxpayer joined with two
other corporations and an individual in organizing a corporation to
produce suitable castings. The new corporation's product was un-
satisfactory, and it experienced financial difficulties. As the Korean
conflict ebbed, castings became available from other sources, and the
taxpayer's orders to the new corporation decreased, until by the end
of the conflict they had completely stopped. Shortly thereafter, tax-
payer sold its stock for a nominal amount.
The Tax Court found that the taxpayer did not intend to hold the
stock as an investment, but to insure itself a supply of needed castings.
Therefore, the loss was held to be ordinary because "where the only
purpose is to insure a vital source of inventory [the stock] is not a
capital asset, and the loss upon its sale is deductible from ordinary
income."7'1 The court acknowledged that the stock was listed as an
investment on the taxpayer's books, but held this fact to be incon-
clusive. Instead, the following factors were considered indicative of
the lack of an investment purpose: taxpayer owned no other secur-
ities; the new corporation sold all of its product at cost to the share-
holders; taxpayer was unable to purchase the needed castings else-
where; and taxpayer held the stock only so long as was reasonably
necessary under the relevant market conditions.2
The "source-of-materials" cases have almost uniformly 3 resulted
in victory for the taxpayer. Courts have had little difficulty in finding
that stock purchased to insure a needed supply of goods is "business
property."74 The acquisition of needed raw materials or supplies is
xeadily identified with the everyday business operations of the
taxpayer.
Inc., 29 T.C. 118 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958) (shortage of
whiskey); Old Dominion Plywood Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 678 (1966) (shortage
of lumber products); Helen M. Livesley, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 133 (1960) (shortage
of potatoes); Arlington Bowling Corp., 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 896 (1959) (shortage
of bowling pins).
70. 33 T.C. 1026 (1960).
71. Id. at 1031.
72. Id.
73. Two "source-of-materials" cases have been decided against the taxpayer be-
cause the underlying business reason for purchasing the securities had ceased to exist
at the time of their disposition. Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962); Gulftex Drug
Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 118 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.
1958). For a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying note 96 infra.
74. See Herzberg, supra note 57, at 176-78; Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 196-
204. Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 Cur. BumL. 275, indicates the Commissioner's acceptance
of ordinary loss consequences in "source-of-materials" cases.
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2. Other Cases.-However, the judicial erosion of the concept of
securities as capital assets is not limited to the "source-of-materials"
situation. The "business property"-"investnent property" distinction
has been extended into other, widely diverse areas. Securities have
been held to be non-capital "business property" when the purpose for
their acquisition was: protecting and retaining a valuable source of
purchases of the taxpayer's products;75 diversifying the taxpayer's
business;76 enabling taxpayer, who operated an insurance agency, to
enter into a favorable agency contract;77 obtaining a source of
competent personnel to market taxpayer's products;78 enabling the
taxpayer to sell mortgages to the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion;7 9 and ridding the taxpayer of a shareholder whose continued
ownership of stock in the taxpayer-corporation jeopardized its con-
tinued existence. 0 As is well demonstrated by a recent Seventh
Circuit case, John 1. Gler Co. v. United States,81 it is impossible to
predict the outer boundaries of the rapidly expanding application of
the "business property" concept 82 In the Grier case, the taxpayer-
corporation operated restaurants adjacent to railroad stations. Wishing
to diversify because of reduced railroad activity, it purchased other
types of eating establishments. As part of this diversification program,
the taxpayer purchased all of the stock of a corporation operating
a supper club. Stock, rather than assets, was acquired because the
taxpayer felt that the owner of the land upon which the club was
located would not consent to an assignment of the lease. The price
paid for the stock was identical to the sales price of the selling
corporation's assets. The supper club's operations were integrated
with taxpayer's business. Three years after the acquisition, the stock
was sold at a loss. The court, in holding that the loss sustained was
an ordinary loss, said:
Corporate stock is not invariably classified as a capital asset. To ascertain
whether stock is bought and kept not for investment purposes, but only as
an incident to the conduct of the taxpayer's business, all the surrounding
circumstances must be considered. The substance, as distinguished from the
75. Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
76. John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964).
77. Southeastern Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 412 (1966).
78. Weather-Seal, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 471 (1963).
79. Schumacher Mortgage Co., v. United States, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9524 (W.D.
Tenn. 1960); McMillan Mortgage Co., 36 T.C. 924 (1961).
80. Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
81. 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964).
82. Several post-Corn Products non-"source-of-materials" cases have rejected the tax-
payer's claim that the securities were "business property." Light Aggregates, Inc. v.
United States, 225 F. Supp. 253 (D.S.D. 1963); Wilaka Builders, Inc., v. United
States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9159 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Duffey v. Lethbert, 63-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. ff 9442 (D. Minn. 1963); Martin v. United States, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9990
(N.D. Ga. 1956); Ancel Greene & Co., 38 T.C. 125 (1962).
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form, of the taxpayer's actions determines whether the sale of the stock
results in ordinary gain or loss in this particular case ....
The Evergreen stock had value only to someone who wished to operate
the Club. Grier bought the stock and retained it only to secure the assets
as an incident to conduct of its restaurant business and not for invest-
ment ....
Nor can we agree with the government that this case is basically dis-
tinguishable in principle from those cases involving purchase of stock to
insure a source of supply for inventory or to post security for performance
of a contract.83
This decision appears to bestow the benefits of ordinary tax treat-
ment upon a transaction which is something more than an "everyday
business transaction." The stock was purchased to enable the tax-
payer to use the club and all of its accompanying assets in his
business. The objects of the transaction-the club and its furnishings-
are not the type of assets which are normally transferred or con-
sumed in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit's concept of "business property" appears to be broader than
that of the "sources-of-materials" cases, because in those cases the
reasons prompting the stock acquisition were truly "everyday busi-
ness" reasons. The Grier case is representative of the judicial expan-
sion of the "business property" concept.
8 4
D. Factors Indicating Purpose of Acquisition and Holding
As noted earlier, 5 the "business property"-"investment property"
distinction places an emphasis on the use made of the property
rather than its external characteristics. Therefore, the purpose for
which the taxpayer purchases and holds the securities is determinative.
It is important to examine the factors relied on by the courts in
their attempts to ascertain the reasons for vhich securities are
purchased and held.
Of course, the first question asked by the courts is: What was
the exact reason for the acquisition of the securities by the taxpayer?
Usually, the answer to this question is decisive in determining whether
the taxpayer possessed the requisite "business purpose." If the tax-
payer's purpose is to insure a needed supply of goods, a "business
purpose" is almost automatically found.8 However, if the court is
faced with a non-"source-of-materials" case, the difficulty of its task
is increased due to the uniqueness of the factual situation with which
it is confronted. 87 The question of relevant taxpayer intent is a
83. John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1964).
84. See Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 206-07.
85. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
86. See notes 69-73 supra.
87. "A legislative attempt to draw a distinction between the tax on capital gain and
ordinary income must necessarily produce a puzzling line of decisions for the facts
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factual one in which "the circumstances of the transaction, its fact-
ual background, the necessities of the business involved and the
intentions of [the] taxpayer" must be considered. These factors will
reveal the taxpayer's purpose-be it "business" or "mivestment"-for
acquiring and holding the stock.
Various minor factors aid the court in its determination of the
reason for which the securities were purchased and held by the tax-
payer. The cumulative effect of these minor factors may change the
result in a close case. However, their importance is not great when
taken individually. For instance, the fact that the taxpayer has made
little or no expenditure for other securities may indicate that he is
not holding the securities in question for an "investment" purpose.89
If a taxpayer has only a slight chance of recovering his investment, a
"business" purpose is indicated.90 However, hope or expectation of
recovering money spent on the securities does not require the loss to
be capital in nature.91 Also, an actual failure to receive dividends
or other income from the issuer of the securities is indicative of a
"business" purpose.92 But the receiving of dividends from the issuer
does not necessitate the finding of an "investment" purpose if counter-
vailing "business" factors are present.93 The fact that the securities
are entered in accounting records or tax returns as "investments" is
competent evidence showing an "investment purpose," but is of
little consequence in the face of conflicting evidence.94
It is very important to note that the "business" purpose for acquir-
ing the stock can change to an "investment" purpose while the stock
is held. The taxpayer's intent may change after the securities have
been acquired, and with the change of intent there is a change in
the character of the securities. For a loss on the sale or worthlessness
of securities to be given ordinary loss treatment, a "business" purpose
must still exist at the time of the sale or worthlessness. If the securities
are not disposed of within a reasonable period of time after the
are as variable as human activities." Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 167, 170
(3d Cir. 1956) (Goodrich, J.).
88. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944, 946 (1955).
89. See Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C. 1026, 1031 (1960); Rev. Rul. 58-40,
1958-1 Ctr. BULL. 275. But see Arlington Bowling Corp., 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
896 (1959) (fact that taxpayer had other investments is no barrier to finding "busi-
ness" purpose).
90. Weather-Seal, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 471 (1963); Tulane Hardwood
Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
91. Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
92. Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Electrical Fittings
Corp., 33 T.C. 1026 (1960).
93. See Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605, 608 (E.D. Va.
1958).
94. Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Smith &
Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958); Electrical Fittings
Corp., 33 T.C. 1026 (1960).
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underlying business reason for their acquisition ceases to exist, the
purpose of the taxpayer's holding will be considered to be of an
"investment" nature from the time of the end of that reasonable
period.95 This point is illustrated by a Tax Court case, Missisquoi
Corp.,96 in which the taxpayer purchased debentures to protect its
supply of an essential raw material, unbleached sulphite pulp. The
acute shortage of suitable pulp was ended by 1952, but the taxpayer
did not sell the debentures until 1955. The court felt that if the
debentures had been sold or had become worthless within "a reason-
able time" after the reason for acquisition had ceased to exist, the
Tulane Hardwood rule would have controlled. However, a reasonable
time for resale had passed, and the taxpayer could no longer claim
"the cloak of . . . business purpose for which [the debentures] were
originally acquired."97 The "reasonableness" of the holding period
will be determined from the facts of the case. Although it does not
appear that the taxpayer is precluded from endeavoring, for a reason-
able period of time, to obtain the best possible price for the securities,98
Missisquoi emphasized that the taxpayer may not hold the securities
indefinitely while waiting for a better price.
There are other problems with which courts are concerned in the
corporate stock area. One of these involves the control the taxpayer
exercises over the corporation issuing the stock in question. The Com-
missioner apparently feels that the stock involved must represent a
minority interest and must not be equivalent to the control of the
corporation.99 This rule has been rejected, both explicitly'00 and im-
plicitly,11' by the courts. Ordinary loss treatment has been given to
taxpayers holding 100 per cent of the stock of the issuing corpora-
95. See Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 275 (securities must be disposed of
within relatively short time after acquisition); 3B J. MEEns, supra note 17, § 22.16 at
105-06; Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 199-200.
96. 37 T.C. 791 (1962). Other cases denying ordinary loss treatment because of
failure to dispose of securities within a reasonable period are Gulftex Drug Co. v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 118 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958),
and Ancel Greene & Co., 38 T.C. 125 (1962).
97. Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791, 797 (1962).
98. See Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
An interesting problem is raised by Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 202. Because the
classification of the asset at the time of its sale or disposition controls the tax treatment
given, the purpose of the acquisition of the asset should be irrelevant except as an
indication of the taxpayer's purpose in holding the asset. Therefore, a taxpayer should
be allowed to prove that securities have been converted into non-capital assets through
the occurrence of some event subsequent to the acquisition. There have apparently
been no cases ruling on this situation.
99. See Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 Cum. Bu... 275; Herzberg, supra note 57, at 177.
100. Old Dominion Plywood Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 678 (1966).
101. John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964); Booth
Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Southeastern Aviation
Underwriters, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 412 (1966).
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tion,1' 2 and the same result has been accorded to taxpayers with very
small stock holdings.'0 The amount of stock held by the taxpayer
probably should be a neutral factor. For instance, ownership of a
large percentage of the stock of a corporation supplying a needed raw
material to the taxpayer might indicate a "business" purpose because
of the taxpayer's increased ability to get the goods he needs. On the
other hand, the same high percentage ownership might tend to indi-
cate an "investment" purpose, in that it could be argued that the
taxpayer bought the stock for the purpose of controlling and managing
the corporation, rather than insuring a needed supply of goods. The
"source-of-materials" cases seem to say that actual control of the
supplier, or a contractual right to the goods, is not necessary. An un-
enforceable understanding may be sufficient.104
Another question raised by these cases involves the degree of busi-
ness need motivating the purchase of the stock. It seems clear that
it need not be a "life-and-death" matter for the stock to be held non-
capital. The Tax Court has stated:
It is not necessary for petitioners to prove that, absent the claimed expense,
[taxpayer's] business would have been crippled or would have failed.
Responsible businessmen make legitimate expenditures every day that would
not measure up to such a "survival' test.
105
A district court has expressly recognized that the section 1221 "busi-
ness" purpose test is the same as that used under section 162(a) for
determining what constitutes an "ordinary and necessary" expense. 0
6
Thus, in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, the purchase of the se-
curities must be "appropriate and helpfu" 10 7 to the carrying on of
the taxpayer's everyday business operations; it must be a "common
and accepted means" 108 used in these business operations. However,
this view would not be completely accurate in those cases where busi-
ness loss treatment is given.10 9 The Tulane Hardwood'" case, which
held that the worthless debentures could be fully deducted as either
a business expense or business loss, stated that the taxpayer purchased
the debentures as a "reasonable and necessary act in the conduct of
102. John J. Crier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964); Booth News-
papers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
103. Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958).
104. See id.; Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955). See general
discussion in Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 202-03.
105. Helen M. Livesley, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 133, 140 (1960).
106. Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1958).
107. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
108. Id. See also 4A J. MERTENs, LAw oF FEDRaL INCoME TAXATION § 25.09
(Riordan ed. 1966).
109. See, e.g., John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964).
110. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
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its business.""' This test would be more inclusive, applying both to
sections 162(a) and 165(a). 112 It is clear that "reasonable and neces-
sary," as applied in the cases, means "reasonable" and "appropriate,"
rather than "reasonable" and "absolutely necessary." The degree of
need should be regarded as evidence of the probable intent of the
taxpayer."
3
, A related problem concerns the distinction often drawn between
securities acquired for the purpose of expanding the taxpayer's busi-
ness and securities acquired for the purpose of protecting an existing
business. Several securities cases have suggested that a division should
be drawn between these two types of transactions, with only the
latter classified as "business property."" 4 A district court has stated
that it
believes that a distinction has been drawn between cases in which securities
are acquired for the purpose of obtaining an advantage which did not
previously exist, as contrasted with situations in which securities are pur-
chased for the purpose of protecting that which existed and is now threat-
ened.115
However, only one post-Corn Products securities case has utilized this
expansion-protection division to deny ordinary loss treatment. In
Duffey v. Lethert,"6 a district court ruled that stock of a newly organ-
ized publishing company, acquired by a paper jobber in order to
make sales of paper to the publisher, was a capital asset. The court
felt that there is a vital difference between buying a source of supply
of a needed raw material to keep from going out of business and
"buying stock in a new and totally unproved company in an effort
to increase sales. The former case is one of a necessary expenditure;
the latter is a speculative one."1 7 Bagley & Sewall was distinguished
on the ground that in that case the bond purchase was necessary if
111. Id. at 1150.
112. Since Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., the loss on disposition of "business"
securities has been consistently treated as a business expense under section 162(a)
or a business loss under section 165(a). The deduction is taken in the year of the
loss. Some of the pre-1955 "tie-in" cases treated the loss as an element of the cost
of goods sold. See note 36 supra. For a discussion of the merits of the cost-of-goods-
sold approach, see Note, Tie-In Sales: Treatment of Loss on Resale of Property
Purchased for the Purpose of Obtaining Other Property, 10 TAx L. RIEv. 145 (1954).
113. See Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 198-99.
114. See Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Duffey v.
Lethert, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9442 (D. Minn. 1963); Weather-Seal, Inc., 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 471 (1963); Smith & Welton, Inc., v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605
(E.D. Va. 1958); cf. Chase Candy Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 521 (Ct. CI.
1954). This general distinction is recognized in several non-securities cases. See
especially Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). See generally 4A J. Mravzx.Ns,
supra note 108, at §§ 25.09, 25.20, 25.40.
115. Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1958).
116. 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9442 (D. Minn. 1963).
117. Id. at 88, 191.
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the taxpayer were to obtain the manufacturing contract involved,
while the issuer in Duffey v. Lethert was a new corporation and sales
might never be made to it. The court concluded:
But it is not so much the speculative nature of this transaction which takes
it from the purview of Section 162(a), it is the fact that the expenditure
looked principally to the future, promising additional gain, and not to the
matter of keeping what business the [taxpayer] already had.118
This latter statement appears to have considerable precedent against
it. Several cases have involved purchases clearly motivated by a de-
sire to expand, diversify or gain business. 119 These taxpayers "looked
principally to the future," and still received ordinary loss treatment.
IV. MAjoR PRoBLEM AREAS
A. The Definitional Problem
By developing the "business property"-"investment property" dis-
tinction, the courts have attempted to give the definitional term "prop-
erty" a meaning consistent with basic congressional policies. 12 In the
Corn Products case, the Supreme Court approved this basic distinc-
tion, and thereby authorized the use of the "business property" con-
cept as a tool by courts faced with difficult definitional problems. This
concept has received further, specialized development in the securities
area. In the source-of-materials area, the "business property" rationale
has been firmly established. However, as pointed out in the discus-
sion of the "protecting present business"-"acquiring new business"
distinction,'2 ' the source-of-materials area is still in a state of un-
certainty and evolution. Furthermore, the newest area of develop-
ment for the "business property" concept is in cases not dealing with
the traditional source-of-materials situation. Because these new cases
involve factual situations never before faced by the courts, uneven
and perhaps inconsistent capital gain and loss treatment has re-
sulted.1 The major reason for this uncertainty is that objective,
118. Id.
119. See John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964) (see
discussion accompanying notes 81-83 supra); Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp.
434 (E.D. Wis. 1961), where stock purchased for purpose of obtaining newsprint was
shown to be "business" property by fact that additional newsprint resulted in vastly
increased profits through expansion in circulation and advertising linage. Also, Com-
missioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955), clearly involves a
taxpayer who "looked to the future" and gained business he would not otherwise have
had; Southeastern Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 412 (1966)
(stock bought for purpose of enabling taxpayer to obtain an advantageous new con-
tract).
120. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
122. Compare John I. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964),
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easily ascertainable limits to the "business property" concept have
not yet evolved. The rules are fairly easy to state: "profits and losses
arising from the everyday operation of business [shall] be considered
as ordinary income or loss;"'23 an ordinary loss results if the tax-
payer's "action in purchasing the [security] was a reasonable and
necessary act in the conduct of its business."124 However, it is un-
realistic to expect the courts to apply these broad, somewhat vague
rules to widely diverse factual situations and achieve uniform orderly
results. Both Congress and the courts have sensed the basic difference
between "everyday business operations" and "investments." But to be
able to solve the difficult problems arising on the "business property"
frontiers, the courts must be guided by more than this general notion.
Instead, specific, reasoned answers must be given to the questions:
What is "business property"? What are "everyday business opera-
tions"? It is one thing to state that the "business"-"investment"
distinction exists; it is quite another to make that distinction workable
in unforeseen factual situations. Taxpayers and courts should be pro-
vided with workable standards which provide a greater degree of
foreseeability as to the category into which a transaction will be
placed. The distinction must be clarified so that a more conclusive
dividing line can be drawn in future cases.125
B. The Administrative Problem
The "business property" cases have also raised a severe adminis-
trative problem for the Commissioner. All of the post-Corn Products
corporate securities cases have involved claims by taxpayers that an
ordinary loss should be allowed because securities were "business
property." No case has been found in which the Commissioner was
able to establish that a gain on sale of securities should be treated
as ordinary income under the Corn Products doctrine.12 In fact, there
is apparently no post-Corn Products court case where the Commis-
sioner has even taken such a position. 7 The reason for this is fairly
with Duffey v. Lethert, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f1 9442 (D. Minn. 1963). See Troxell &
Noall, supra note 35, at 207-08.
123. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
124. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146, 1150 (1955).
125. Several commentators have noted that the taxpayers and courts are deprived
of a sufficiently objective guide in this area. See Freeman, supra note 47; Herzberg,
Capital Loss or Business Deduction, 43 TAxEs 176, 179 (1965); Kaufmann, supra
note 64, at 607; Surrey, supra note 9, at 995; Troxell & Noall, supra note 35, at 207-08;
Note, supra note 67, at 409. "The boundary line between capital gains and other income
is arbitrary, capricious, subject to manipulation, and an invitation to litigation." Groves,
Taxation of Capital Gains, 2 TAx REmION CoMI'ENDrum 1193, 1196 (House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means 1959).
126. See Kaufmann, supra note 64, at 612.
127. Id; cf. Harry Dunitz, 7 T.C. 672 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 167 F.2d 223 (6th
Cir. 1948).
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obvious. If the securities are sold at a loss, the taxpayer may report
the loss as an ordinary deduction. If the treatment of the loss is sub-
sequently questioned on an examination of the return, the taxpayer
can emphasize the underlying business context, and take the question
to court if necessary. But if the property is sold at a profit, the tax-
payer may report the increment as capital gain without mentioning
any surrounding circumstances. Thus, on the strength of the informa-
tion contained in the return, the Commissioner will not be able to
differentiate between dispositions of "business property" and "in-
vestment property." The Commissioner is obviously unable to scruti-
nize the circumstances surrounding all reported capital gains. There-
fore, he does not possess an effective enforcement tool.
The above result does not necessarily presuppose bad faith on the
part of the taxpayer. Securities may be purchased for a variety of
reasons. A taxpayer may invest in stock for valid "business" purposes,
but at the same time feel that the stock has a good chance for appreci-
ation. If the stock is subsequently sold at a gain, the taxpayer, in his
own mind, may emphasize the "investment" motive. If the stock is
subsequently sold at a loss, he is likely to think of the loss as an
unavoidable business expense, and not as an indication of his own
lack of investment expertise. As one commentator says: "The tax-
payer in effect is almost forced to take advantage of the present 'loop-
hole' by operation of human psychology."
28
In summation, the two major problems in this area seem to be:
(1) the lack of objective, easily ascertainable limits to the "business
property" concept; and (2) the opportunity offered taxpayers to take
unwarranted advantage of the "business property" concept by taking
capital gains treatment in the case of a gain and ordinary loss treat-
ment in the case of a loss.
129
C. Solving the Definitional Problem
1. Basic Capital Gains Policies.-The drawing of the "business prop-
erty"-"investment property" distinction should be based on those basic
policy considerations associated with capital gain and loss treatment.
The dividing line should not be arbitrarily drawn, but should be con-
sistent with the objectives sought to be achieved by the statutory
distinction. This is not to say that the preferential treatment given
capital gains is necessarily wise from a tax policy viewpoint.130 An
128. Kaufmann, supra note 64, at 613. See Note, supra note 67, at 409.
129. This is similar to the treatment afforded "section 1231" assets. INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 1231.
130. A vast amount of literature deals with arguments for and against special treat-
ment for capital gains and losses. For a convenient summary of these arguments see
Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Argument, 35 TAxEs 247 (1957).
For more detailed comments on policy issues, see 2 HOuSE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
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examination of operative economic, accounting and tax administration
policies has led many to reject the present statutory distinction, and
to urge either complete elimination of the capital gain-ordinary in-
come differentiation, or substantial revision of the capital gain and
loss provisions. 131 This note does not pursue those inquiries. Instead,
it assumes the continuance of preferential statutory treatment of
capital gain and the general capital gain statutory and case law prin-
ciples.132 For the purpose of this present study, it is assumed that the
relevant tax policy considerations favor the continued maintenance
of a special capital gains tax category. This study will briefly examine
the major policies associated with preferential capital gain treatment,
and will then use these policies as a basis for a proper definition of the
"business property" concept.
Many arguments have been advanced in support of the present
treatment of capital gain and loss.1' However, the preferential treat-
ment accorded capital assets appears to rest primarily on three basic
policies:134 (1) ameliorating the effect of "bunched" income; (2) in-
creasing the mobility of investment funds; and (3) furnishing a posi-
tive incentive for capital formation and risk-taking. For the distinc-
tion derived from these policies to be meaningful, they must be
accompanied by an intensely practical policy consideration: taxpayers
must not be allowed to avoid taxes by converting ordinary income
into capital gain.
The first of these basic policies is: relief should be provided against
the impact of progressive rates on the bunching of gain in one tax
TAx REvasioN CoMPENDUm 1193-1299 (1959); JoINT Co ¢M. ON THE EcoNoMIsc
REPORT, FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, 84th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 367-404 (1955); L. SELTzER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL
GAINs Amw LossEs (1951); TAX ADViSORY STAFF, TREAsURY DEPARTMENT, FEDERAL
INCo E TAx TREATmENT OF CrrAL GAiNs AN LossEs (1951); Blum, Taxation of
Capital Gains in the Light of Recent Economic Developments-Some Observations, 18
NAT'L TAX J. 430 (1965); Slitor, Problems of Definition under the Capital Gains Tax,
10 NAT'L TAX J. 26 (1957); Somers, Reconsideration of the Capital Gains Tax, 13
NAT'L TAX J. 289 (1960); Wallich, Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of Recent
Economic Developments, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (1965).
131. See, e.g., Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, 2 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUtm 1193
(House Committee on Ways and Means 1959).
132. These are the same basic assumptions as those of an American Law Institute
study of definitional problems in capital gains taxation. ALI DIscUss ON DRAFr STUDY
OF DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAIrrAL GAiNs TAXATION (1960) [hereinafter cited as
DiscussioN DaF-r STUDY].
133. Professor Blum lists 25 arguments for preferential treatment for capital gains.
Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Argument, 35 TAxEs 247, 248-61
(1957).
134. The conclusion that these three policies are "basic" was reached after a
consideration of the writings listed in note 130 supra; DisCUssIoN DRAFT STUDY; Com-
ment, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and Ordinary Income, 73 YALE
L.J. 693 (1964); Katcher, A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation Problems and Proposals,
t. So. CAL. 1962 TAx INsT. 769.
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year.135 This bunching results from the holding of property over a
period of several years during the course of which there is an incre-
ment in the value of the property. When the property is sold, taxation
at ordinary rates of the entire gain which has accumulated during the
holding period may result in an unusually large tax because of the
concentration of the gain in the year of sale. Because of the progres-
sive rate structure, the taxpayer may be taxed at a higher rate than
that resulting from taxation spread throughout the holding period.
This result is generally considered objectionable from the viewpoint
of fairness to the taxpayer.
13 6
The second basic policy favoring preferential treatment of capital
gains is: the tax structure should relieve the impediment to the
transfer of investment assets which may result from the imposition
of a tax on the gain at the time of the transfer. This is the so-called
"locked-in" aspect of capital gains taxation. A taxpayer holding ap-
preciated income-producing property has the choice of holding or
selling the property. If he continues to hold the property he pays
only a tax on the income from the property. If he sells and reinvests
the proceeds he pays a tax both on the appreciation in value of the
property and on the income from the reinvested proceeds. There-
fore, a full tax on capital gains might influence the taxpayer to hold
the property instead of selling it and realizing gain. As a result, some
sales which would have been made in the absence of tax considera-
tions may not be made. This decreased mobility of capital invest-
ment is undesirable because it would tend to prevent the most ef-
ficient allocation of resources.
137
The third basic policy associated with capital gain treatment is:
a positive incentive for capital formation and risk-taking should be
furnished. A lower rate for capital gains operates to attract funds
into activities which may produce capital gains. A premium is placed
on risky business ventures because when they are successful the
capital appreciation is likely to be relatively large and the ordinary
income relatively small. To subject this large capital appreciation
to progressive rates would be to discourage capital formation and
risky business ventures. This policy of encouraging risk-taking is a
positive one-the tax system is employed to direct economic activity
135. The policy of relieving the taxpayer from the effects of "bunching" has been
stated to be the reason for the original enactment of special treatment for capital
gains. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932).
136. See generally DIscussIoN DaAT STUDY 187-89; Blum, supra note 133, at 253.
137. For general discussions of the "locked-in" aspect, see BRoWN, Tm LoCYD-IN
PROBLEm, FEDERAL TAx POLICY FOR EcONOMIc GRoxWTH AiN STABILITY 367 (Joint
Committee on the Economic Report 1955); DiscussioN DRAFT STUY 183-87; Blum,
supra note 133, at 256-58; Wallich, supra note 130, at 142-50.
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along lines of economic expansion. 38 This should be distinguished
from the anti-'lock-in" policy, a neutral policy based on the view that
the tax system should not interfere with the operation of market
mechanisms.
2. The ALl Discussion Draft Study-General Definition.-The pres-
ent uncertainty in the capital gains definitional area indicates the
extreme difficulty of fashioning a workable capital asset classification
from the three basic policies discussed above. However in 1960, the
Tax Policy Committee and Tax Advisory Group of the American Law
Institute undertook to achieve this very goal. The results of this
exhaustive study are reported in the Discussion Draft Study of Defini-
tional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation (hereinafter referred to in
text as Discussion Draft Study). Because of the expertise of the
participants in the study3 9 and the high quality of their discussion
and proposals, the Discussion Draft Study will be used as the basis
for this note's attempt to clarify the "business property" concept.
The Discussion Draft Study "assumes the continuance of a pref-
erential statutory treatment of capital gain.., and the broad assump-
tions of statutory and case law as to the general principles governing
the classification of gain or loss as capital or ordinary."140 Using the
three basic policy justifications for the present preferential capital
gain treatment as a basis for discussion, the Discussion Draft Study
evolves a general residual capital asset definition:
An asset . . . shall be treated as a capital asset if it satisfies the following
conditions-
(A) the asset is of a class which characteristically requires either an outlay
of funds or a commitment of credit at the time of its acquisition; and
(B) the asset is not a limited duration asset .... 141
A "limited duration asset" is defined as:
[A]n asset other than an asset which is of a character such that-
(A) the future period during which the asset can reasonably be expected
(at the time of its disposition) to have substantial value is not less than
- years, or
(B) the length of the future period during which the asset can reasonably
be expected (at the time of its disposition) to have substantial value cannot
be ascertained to be less than - years. 142
The Discussion Draft Study does not fix the specific number of years
of anticipated future life to be required for qualification as a capital
138. For general discussion of the "incentive" aspect, see DiscussioN DAFr STUDY
189-91; Blum, supra note 133, at 259-60; Groves, supra note 125, at 1197-98.
139. The ALI reporters were Stanley S. Surrey and William C. Warren.
140. DiscussioN DRAFr STUDY 1.
141. Id. at 21.
142. Id. at 28.
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asset, but leaves this question open. However, the relevant factors
for this determination are discussed, and the desired time interval
would appear to be between 19 and 30 years.
143
The two facets of the Discussion Draft Study's general capital asset
definition are reflections of the relevant capital gains policies. The
first facet-"the asset is of a class which characteristically requires
either an outlay of funds or a commitment of credit at the time of
its acquisition"-requires that the asset represent a substantial capital
investment. This "capital investment" requirement is significant from
the viewpoint of the third basic policy-capital gain treatment should
furnish a positive incentive for capital formation and risk-taking. If
the inherent nature of the asset is such that its acquisition does not
characteristically involve an outlay of funds or commitment of credit,
the according of capital gain treatment cannot be justified on the
ground of encouraging risk-taking. Hence, capital gain treatment
should not be given to sales of assets not requiring substantial capital
investment.144
The second facet of the Discussion Draft Study's definition-"the
asset is not a limited duration asset"-requires that the asset represent
a fairly long period of "capital commitment." This requirement is
primarily related to the second basic policy-capital gain treatment
should not discourage the mobility of capital. The Discussion Draft
Study's analysis shows that the tax impediment to the sale of an asset
which has a relatively short future life is less than the impediment
to the sale of an asset which has a relatively long future life. The
decision to sell an appreciated asset involves the relinquishment of
the power to defer tax on the appreciation inherent in the asset. This
power is worth less in the case of short-lived assets than in the case
of long-lived assets. Inasmuch as a less valuable power to defer tax
is relinquished, a sale of a short-lived asset which is subject to a
higher rate of tax involves a deterrent or impediment to sale which
is approximately equivalent to that involved in a correspondingly
lower rate of tax on the sale on longer-lived assets. This equivalence
may be made specific by means of interest computations, which lead
to the determination of a specific number of years to place in the
definition of 'limited duration asset."145 In summation, the second
143. Id. at 55-58, see note 150 infra.
144. For a discussion of the "capital investment" requirement, see DiscussioN
DRAFT- STUDy 11, 53, 189-91. Examples of assets not requiring an outlay of funds or
commitment of credit at the time of acquisition are: (1) right of privacy; and (2)
employment contract.
145. "If an after-tax rate of return [on the investment in the asset] is assumed, then
a full tax on the sale of an asset with a future life of a particular number of years can
be shown to involve the same impediment to sale as a corresponding reduced rate
of tax on the sale of an asset with an indefinite life. Thus, computation at an after-tax
rate of return of 5 per cent shows that a tax at regular rates when applied to the sale of
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facet of the Study's definition operates to bestow capital gain treat-
ment only on those transactions in which a higher tax would tend to
produce a "locked-in" effect.'4
The Study also recognizes that the non-'limited duration" require-
ment is related to the first basic policy-capital gain taxation should
provide relief against the impact of progressive rates on the bunching
of gain in the year of sale. The sale of an appreciated asset will bunch
into a single year income reflecting the asset's appreciation. In the
case of a continued holding, this income would be spread over a longer
period of time. Obviously, the bunching effect is not as severe if the
asset is relatively short-lived. Hence, full taxation in a single year of
a short-lived asset's appreciation is not as unfair to the taxpayer. Al-
though the Discussion Draft Study recognizes the relationship between
the bunching-avoidance policy and the non-"limited duration" require-
ment, it does not regard the providing of relief against bunching as
an appropriate function of the capital asset definition. Because there
is a pronounced difference between the length of asset life which will
make the bunching effect significant and the length of asset life which
will make the "locked-in" effect significant, it is felt that the capital
asset definition is not an appropriate mechanism to effectuate both
of these policies.147 The Discussion Draft Study concludes that relief
against bunching can be more effectively provided by an averaging
device, which operates outside the context of capital gain treatment.
For this reason, the bunching aspect is not used as a factor upon which
to base the capital asset definition.148
The Discussion Draft Study's general definition of "capital asset"
is a reasonably accurate reflection of the three major capital gain
policies. As shown above, these policies would seem to demand that
capital gain treatment be restricted to transactions involving assets
requiring a substantial amount of "capital investment" and represent-
ing a fairly long period of "capital commitment." It is submitted that
these general criteria should guide the drawing of a distinction be-
tween "investment property" and "business property." However, the
an asset with a future life of 30 years is approximately equivalent impediment to
the sale as is a tax at one-half the regular rates when applied to the sale of an asset
with an indefinite life." Id. at 9. Similarly, computation at after-tax rates of return
of 6 and 8 per-cent shows that a tax at regular rates when applied to the sale of
assets with future lives of 26 and 19 years, respectively, is equivalent, as an impediment
to sale, to a tax at one-half the regular rates when applied to the sale of assets with
indefinite lives. Id. See also id. at 55-58.
146. For a discussion of the relationship between the "locked-in" aspect and the"capital commitment" requirement, see id. at 8-10, 53-58, 183-87.
147. The study's analysis shows that the bunching effect may become significant after
three years. In contrast, the 'ocked-in" effect may not warrant special treatment of gain
unless the asset has a much longer life, such as 19, 26 or 30 years. Id. at 188-89.
148. Id. at 8, 10-11, 188-89. Sections X1300 and X1309 of the Draft Statute pro-
vide the averaging mechanisms. Id. at 41-45, 49-51. See id. at 101-23.
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general definition itself is not entirely adequate for this purpose,
since its deals with the inherent nature of the asset; that is, the defini-
tion specifies the type of asset which requires an "outlay of funds
or a commitment of credit" and is relatively long-lived. This is to be
contrasted with the functional approach of the Corn Products doctrine
which makes the use made of the asset rather than its inherent nature
controlling. The inherent nature of corporate securities would almost
invariably cause them to be classified as capital assets. However, the
Corn Products doctrine would disregard their inherent nature if
they are used in the everyday business operations of the taxpayer.149
The relevant capital gain policies teach that the "business property"-
investment property" distinction should be based upon the concepts
of "capital investment" and "capital commitment." However, Corn
Products teaches that this distinction must be drawn along functional
lines, rather than along lines of inherent differences in the charac-
teristics of assets.
3. The ALI Discussion Draft Study-"Permanent Capital"-"Current
Capital" Dichotomy.-The Discussion Draft Study, recognizing the
functional approach of Corn Products, gives separate consideration to
the treatment of gain or loss on the disposition of property held in
connection with the taxpayer's business. 150 The classification of gain
or loss on the disposition of these assets is made to turn upon whether
the assets are a part of "permanent business capita' or "current busi-
ness capital." The distinction between "permanent" and "current"
business capital is intended to present a more precise formulation of
the functional "everyday business operations" test employed by Corn
Products.'5' "Permanent business capital," which corresponds to "in-
vestment property," is defined in this manner:
[T]he permanent capital of a trade or business shall consist of those assets
which are of such a character that they are not normally transferred or
consumed in the ordinary course of that trade or business. 152
Permanent, or fixed, capital is an economist's concept denoting assets
having a useful life of some duration and performing a repetitive or
specialized function. In performing a repetitive function, permanent
149. See Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51-52. See also text
accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra.
150. See DiscussioN DAr STuDY 1, 60.
151. "The distinction between permanent and current business capital is intended to
reflect a principle referred to in the Corn Products case. The distinction is primarily
functional .... ." Id. at 60. This distinction has been adopted by courts in British
Commonwealth countries. Id. at 358. See Slitor, Problems of Definition Under the
Capital Gains Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 26 (1967) (brief examination of Commonwealth
approach).
152. DiscussioN DRAF-r STUDy 22.
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capital assets transfer utility to other assets. The most common types
of permanent capital are land, buildings, machinery and equipment.
Corporate securities would normally be classified as permanent capital
because they are not "normally transferred or consumed in the ordi-
nary course" of business. This is recognized by the Discussion Draft
Study's Draft Statute which lists "securities" as one of the classes of
permanent capital assets.
5 3
"Current business capital" is the Discussion Draft Study's equivalent
to the "business property" concept.
[Tihe current capital of a trade or business shall consist of those assets
which are of such a character that they are normally transferred or con-
sumed in the ordinary course of that trade or business.
154
Assets which are the recipients of the transfer of utility from perma-
nent capital, and assets which facilitate that transfer, are current
capital. Current capital "circulates" during the course of the normal
operating cycle of the business. The most common types of current
capital assets are raw materials, work-in-process, finished products on
hand, trade receivables, and working bank balances. 5
4. The ALI Discussion Draft Study-Securities as "Current Capital."
-The current capital-permanent capital dichotomy would seem to
offer a satisfactory solution to the definitional problem. The Discus-
sion Draft Study's definitions provide the objective and easily ascer-
tainable limits to the "business property" concept which are needed
by courts facing novel factual situations. Furthermore, the Discussion
Draft Study's solution is basically consistent with both sets of stan-
dards examined in this note. First, the three basic capital gains poli-
cies demand that a capital asset be the type of asset which requires
an outlay of funds or commitment of credit, and is relatively long-
lived. A permanent capital asset would usually possess these charac-
teristics, whereas a current capital asset would not. Second, the
153. Id. at 21. The general residual capital asset definition and the definitions of
permanent and current business capital are contained in the Discussion Draft Study's
proposed statute. Although an understanding of the proposed statute is not necessary
to the understanding of the textual discussion of this note, a brief description of the
classification mechanism will be helpful. An asset which cannot be classified as either
permanent business capital or current business capital is a capital asset only if it meets
the terms of the general residual definition: (A) "outlay of funds or commitment
of credit;" (B) "not a limited duration asset." If an asset falls into both the permanent
business capital and current business capital classifications, it is classified as current
business capital.
154. Id. at 23.
155. For the Discussion Draft Study's discussion of current capital, see id. at 358-59.
The Discussion Draft Study notes that the economists functional "current capital" con-
cept should be distinguished from the accountant's concept of "current assets," in
which the degree of liquidity is stressed. Id. at 358. See also Surrey, Definitional
Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HAv. L. Rr.v. 985, 986-87 (1956).
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Corn Products doctrine characterizes as "business property" those
assets used in the everyday business operations of the taxpayer. The
express purpose for the creation of the "current capital" classification
is the delineation of the "business property"-"investment property"
distinction. Furthermore, defining "current capital as those assets
"normally transferred or consumed in the ordinary course of that
trade or business" accurately reflects the Corn Products "everyday
business operations" test.
The current capital concept is made more specific with respect to
securities. The Discussion Draft Study's Draft Statute specifically
categorizes as current capital:
securities acquired in connection with a particular business transaction or a
particular series of business transactions and disposed of with reasonable
promptness after the business purpose of the acquisition has been ful-
filled .... 156
The purpose of this language is to make certain that the "current
capitar' concept is applied to "situations such as that involved in Com-
missioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co."157 The effect of these requirements
is to force the acquisition and holding of the securities into a direct
relationship with a specific business transaction or series of transac-
tions."5 8 This is the equivalent of both the general "current capital"
requirement that the assets be "consumed in the ordinary course'
of business, and the Corn Products requirement that the asset be used
in the taxpayer's everyday business operations. Ordinary treatment
will not be given if the acquisition and holding are tied only to the
general purposes of the taxpayer's business. 59
The scope of the Discussion Draft Study statement is much narrower
than the so-called general rule which is repeated by most of the se-
curities cases:
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act
in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the time of
their sale, any loss incurred [is] ordinary loss.160
Both the Discussion Draft Study rule and the traditional rule are con-
sistent with the Corn Products doctrine. However, the specificity of
the Discussion Draft Study rule goes further to insure that only se-
curities truly connected with everyday business operations will be
given ordinary treatment. Under the Discussion Draft Study rule, the
court would examine one factor: the directness of the connection be-
tween the acquisition and holding of the securities and a specified
156. DiscussIo" DRFT STuDy 23-24.
157. Id. at 63.
158. See id. at 63-64, 373-77.
159. See id. at 63-64.
160. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921, (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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business transaction or group of business transactions. While the court
may not always have an easy task, its determination would be guided
by an objective, easily ascertainable standard. In contrast, the very
generality of the traditional rule has led to some confusion. Think-
ing that any purchase advancing the well-being of the business is
an "integral and necessary act in the conduct of the business," courts
have given ordinary treatment to transactions which had as an ob-
jective the obtaining of permanent capital assets, such as land and
buildings.161 The Discussion Draft Study rule would largely prevent
this result because it forces courts to compare the facts with specific
standards rather than with a general maxim.
5. Comparison of the ALI Discussion Draft Study Definitions with
Present Case Law.-The Discussion Draft Study securities rule ap-
pears to be generally consistent with the source-of-materials cases,6 2
in which securities are acquired "in connection with a ... particular
series of business transactions." The "particular series of business
transactions" with which the acquisition of the securities is connected
would be that series of purchases of the needed supply of goods which
begins with the purchase of the securities and ends with the resump-
tion of a normal supply of the goods. The only source-of-materials
cases not receiving "current capital" treatment would be those in
which the securities were not disposed of with reasonable promptness
after the business purpose of the acquisition has been fulfilled,163 and
those in which the securities, being acquired for general business
purposes, become permanent income-producing capital. A recent Tax
Court case, Old Dominion Plywood Corp.,164 seems to fit into this
latter category. In this case, stock was acquired in order to assure
that the taxpayer's short-range and long-range needs for lumber core
would be satisfied. 65 The stock was not acquired in connection with
a "particular series of transactions," but in connection with general
business needs extending into the indefinite future. The Tax Court's
holding that the stock was a non-capital asset would probably be
reversed by the Discussion Draft Study rule.
It should be noted that the Discussion Draft Study is very restrictive
in its application of its securities rule. In commenting on the rule,
161. See discussion of John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1964), in text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
163. See Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962); Gulftex Drug Co. v. Commissioner,
29 T.C. 118 (1957) aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958). See text accom-
panying notes 95-98 supra.
164. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 678 (1966).
165. The shortage of lumber core was not one of fairly short duration, but apparently
extended into the indefinite future.
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the authors indicate that the definitional phrase "particular series of
business transactions" denotes only those situations in which the
number of transactions and the terms of those transactions are already
known before the purchase of securities is made.166 Thus, ordinary
treatment would be given only in cases such as Bagley & Sewall Co.,167
in which a specified contract was the sole object of the purchase of
securities. This restrictive approach would deny ordinary treatment
to most of the source-of-materials cases. In these cases, the number
and terms of the transactions are not known with exactitude until the
shortage of needed goods has ended. Thus, the Discussion Draft Study
application appears to be overly restrictive. There seems to be no
reason why the number and terms of the transactions in the series
need be exactly known, if the purchases are to be made during a
defined and confined period of time. This latter requirement would
insure that the securities would be current capital, circulating during
the normal operating cycle of the business.
As noted earlier, the non-source-of-materials area is the scene of
rapid, and sometimes inconsistent, development of the "business prop-
erty" concept.168 It is believed that the Discussion Draft Study rules
provide objective, easily ascertainable limits to the concept, which
can be applied by the courts to cases raising these definitional ques-
tions. By applying these rather specific standards, the courts may be
able to achieve relatively uniform results, even in widely diverse
factual situations. The Discussion Draft Study rules would probably
reverse the decision in John J. Grier Co. v. United States,16 9 in which
the acquisition of securities was in connection with the general, long-
range business activities of the taxpayer, rather than in connection
with a limited series of everyday business transactions. Neither the
securities nor the objects of their purchase-the land, building and
furnishings of the club-were to be "consumed in the ordinary course"
of the business. Instead, they all appear to be "permanent capital,"
or "investment property." The Grier decision can be viewed as apply-
ing a step-transaction doctrine because the taxpayer bought the stock
solely to get the assets of the club.170 Regardless of the soundness of
this view, any attempt to base the Grier decision upon the "business
166. See Discussioiq DRAFT STuDy 375-76.
167. 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
168. See text accompanying notes 73-84 supra.
169. 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964).
170. The federal district court reasoned that if the taxpayer had purchased the
physical assets of the club, it would have had ordinary loss on the sale of these assets.
Therefore, ordinary loss on the sale of the stock was thought to be warranted. See
John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. IMI. 1963). For an
expression of doubt as to the validity of that view, see Troxell & Noall, Judicial Erosion
of the Concept of Securities as Capital Assets, 19 TAx L. REv. 185, 206-07 (1964).
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property" doctrine appears to be an unwarranted extension of the
concept.
It is believed that the Discussion Draft Study rules would reject
the distinction often drawn between securities acquired for the pur-
pose of expanding the taxpayer's business and securities acquired for
the purpose of protecting an existing business.' 7 ' If securities are
acquired in connection with a series of everyday business transac-
tions, they should be regarded as "current capitar' or "business prop-
erty" even though the effect of the acquisition is the expansion of the
taxpayer's business. The expansion-protection division does not ap-
pear to bear any particular relationship to the "business property"-
"investment property" distinction. In a sense, all of a taxpayer's every-
day business activities are directed toward "expanding" his business,
by means of gaining new sources of income through improved service
or products. Several well-considered cases have implicitly rejected
the distinction. 7 2
D. Solving the Administrative Problem
As noted above, present methods of reporting income give tax-
payers an opportunity to take unwarranted advantage of the "busi-
ness property" concept by taking capital gain treatment in the case
of a gain on the sale of "business property" and ordinary loss treat-
ment in the case of a loss. This problem stems from the fact that the
taxpayer is not forced to commit himself to any classification until
long after the asset has been acquired. If the asset were classified
at the time of its acquisition, the administrative problem would be
largely solved. It has been proposed that the Commissioner promul-
gate a regulation providing that any security acquired by a taxpayer,
other than a dealer in securities, will be treated as an investment
unless, within thirty days after the date of acquisition, the Commis-
sioner is notified that the security is being held for specified business
purposes as "business property."73 This initial classification would be
determinative in the case' of any later disposition, unless the Com-
missioner finds that the taxpayer's election is unrealistic. The Com-
missioner would not be bound by the election, and could challenge
the taxpayer's chosen classification during the holding of the security,
or at the filing of the taxpayer's return for the year of disposition.
A closely similar solution would be the imposition of a record-keeping
requirement similar to the present statutory requirement imposed
171. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
172. See note 119 supra.
173. Kauffman, A Second Look at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXEs 605, 613
(1963); Note, supra note 67, at 411-12 (1956).
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upon securities dealers holding investment securities. 74 Under this
solution, the security would not be treated as "business property"
unless so identified in the taxpayer's records within thirty days after
the date of its acquisition.
Neither of these requirements is a complete solution to the adminis-
trative problem. The notification requirement would impose other
administrative difficulties upon the Commissioner; the record-keeping
requirement might not be an effective means of enforcement. Further-
more, it may not be appropriate to impose a notification or record-
keeping requirement upon persons who, unlike securities dealers,
cannot be expected to know about such a requirement.17 5 However,
if either requirement could be effectively administered, it would ac-
complish a worthy objective: requiring the taxpayer to elect the tax
treatment he prefers, and to state the grounds for that preference,
before he knows whether there will be a gain or loss.
V. CONCLUSION
Inadequacies of the statutory definition of "capital asset" have led
the courts to develop the concept of "business property," which serves
to distinguish everyday business activities from investment activities.
This concept is now being applied by courts in a wide variety of
factual situations involving corporate securities. However, unless
objective, easily ascertainable limits to the "business property" con-
cept are found, confusion and inconsistency may mark the develop-
ment of future case law. The rules developed by the American Law
Institute's Discussion Draft Study of Definitional Problems in Capital
Gains Taxation appear to provide these objective limits. Because they
are consistent with the Corn Products doctrine, they should be used
by courts confronted with a "business property" question. However,
the best solution to the problem would be congressional enactment
of a more meaningful definitional statute.
THo mAS C. BOST
174. See INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 1236.
175. See DiscussIoN DR=FT STUDY 376-77.
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